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Disaster Risk Reduction, Public Accountability, and the Role of the Media: 
Concepts, Cases, and Conclusions 
Abstract 
This paper argues for the utility of, and offers, a relatively narrow definition of 
accountability, using that definition in combination with an applied analytic framework for 
accountability in the specific policy domain of “Disaster Risk Reduction” (DRR).  That 
framework then informs an analysis of the post-impact role(s) that media played in two major 
2010 events: the January 12 Haiti catastrophe and the February 27 Chile disaster, supplemented 
by an analysis of media coverage in two “mirror countries” that share roughly equivalent 
catastrophe/disaster risk profiles (Jamaica and Peru respectively).  The more specific research 
questions focused on media attention spans, other emergency or disaster relevant media roles, 
and “zones of silence” in event coverage, particularly about pre-event accountability for effective 
DRR. 
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Disaster Risk Reduction, Public Accountability, and the Role of the Media: Concepts, 
Cases, and Conclusions 
I. Key Concepts: Accountability, Disaster, and Disaster Risk Reduction 
Accountability – and the Media 
In a forthcoming article in the journal Environmental Hazards, we (Olson, Sarmiento, 
and Hoberman 2011) concur that the concept of accountability has become iconic to the point 
that no one can be against it, quoting Mark Bovens (2007:49) who argues that accountability is 
now less a useful analytic concept and more “a dustbin filled with good intentions, loosely 
defined concepts, and vague images of good governance.”  The solution to rescuing the 
conceptual and analytic utility of accountability, we argue, is to define it relatively closely and 
apply it to particular policy domains and contexts, the combination giving it operational 
meaning. 
 Our goal in this paper is to adhere to our own advice and (1) offer a relatively narrow 
definition of accountability, (2) adapt, from the work of Bovens, a particular analytic framework 
for accountability, and (3) apply the adapted framework to the specific policy domain of 
“Disaster Risk Reduction.”   
Following that more conceptual discussion, and because the media are often proffered as 
at least a partial solution to the accountability “forum” problem explained below, we will use the 
framework to inform an analysis of the post-impact role(s) that media played in two major 2010 
events: the January 12 Haiti catastrophe, and the February 27 Chile disaster.1  More specifically, 
                                                            
1 See Quarantelli 1987, and then Olson and Gawronski 2010 on the differences between the two concepts. 
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we will analyze not only how the national media in the two affected countries (Haiti and Chile) 
covered the disaster in the first 60 days after impact, but also how and to what extent the media 
in two observing or “mirror countries” that share roughly equivalent catastrophe/disaster risk 
profiles (Jamaica and Peru respectively) played similar or dissimilar roles. 
Our central research questions for the post-impact media analysis, in all four countries, 
will be the following: 
1. What was the attention span, or rate of decay, of media attention to the Haiti 
catastrophe and the Chile disaster? 
2. Aside from providing the normally expected disaster and emergency response 
information, what other roles did the media play, particularly about accountability 
and “Disaster Risk Reduction?” 
3. What major DRR problems or issues were notably absent in media coverage of the 
events?  That is, on what problems or issues were the media silent? 
Defining Our Terms      
Definitional and conceptual clarity are crucial in any attempt to analyze accountability at 
the case level, however, because it always comes down to “accountability to whom, by whom, 
for what, why, and how,” so we must resolve those problems here at the outset of this paper.  
Borrowing from and then synthesizing definitions from Ackerman (2005: 3) and Bovens (2007: 
450), we arrived at the following in our forthcoming paper (italics in the original): 
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Accountability is a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which (a) the 
actor has an obligation to explain and justify his or her plans of action and/or 
conduct, (b) the forum may pose questions, require more information, solicit other 
views, and pass judgment, and (c) the actor may see positive or negative formal 
and/or informal consequences as a result.     
  In his own work, however, Bovens notes that four core questions must always be 
answered if accountability is to have analytic meaning in any specific domain and context: (1) 
What is the forum?  (2) Who is the proper actor/agent to render account?  (3) What is to be 
explained and justified? (4) Why should the actor/agent feel obligated to participate?   
To these four core questions from Bovens, we are adding a fifth, which will take on more 
visible significance when we delve into DRR as a policy domain: How are the actions to be in 
fact accomplished?  In a DRR context, this question triggers consideration of transparency and 
participation.  
With our definition and Bovens’ four core questions, our fifth question, and an original 
schematic (Bovens (2007: 454-455), we then developed the schematic on the following page for 
application to Disaster Risk Reduction (see Figure 1). 
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 Figure 1 
An Adapted Schematic of the Bovens System for Public Accountability  
        Actor as Agent2  →→→→→ informing about conduct →→→→→ Forum as Principal3  
            ↑                                                                                                               ↓ 
            ↑ ← ←← ← ←← questioning, requiring information, ← ← ← ← ← ↓ 
            ↑                                        soliciting other input                                      ↓    
               ↑                                                           ↓                                                       ↓ 
            ↑                                                       →→→→→→→→→→→→   debating      
            ↑                                                                                                               ↓       
            ↑                                                                                                               ↓ 
            ↑                                                                                                           judging 
              ↑                                                                                                                    ↓ 
                 ← ← ← ← ←← ← ← ← ←← ← ← ← ←← ← ← ← ←←  consequences 
                                                                                                                  (positive/negative) 
                                                                                                                   (formal/informal)                                     
The concept “disaster” shares many definitional problems with accountability, in 
particular the fact that everyone seems to want to define it idiosyncratically, leading to a kind of 
conceptual Babel.  In our forthcoming paper we deal with the definitional problems associated 
with disaster, but perhaps committing our own sin (but at least using a 2009 UN definition as a 
basis), we offer the following:  
A disaster is a social crisis characterized by a sense of great uncertainty, 
significant disorder, or potential collapse in a community caused by a serious 
disruption in its normal functioning and involving widespread human, material, 
                                                            
2 In the context of Disaster Risk Reduction, as we will see, the “Who-Actor” component must include not only 
public officials and government employees, but also private sector, civil society, and at times even international 
decision-makers. 
3 Again in the specific context of Disaster Risk Reduction, the “Who-Forum” may be a local city council, a state or 
departmental legislature, a national parliament, a regulatory agency, and/or a judiciary.   
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economic, or environmental losses and impacts that exceed the community’s 
ability to cope using its own resources.4 
It should come as no surprise that “Disaster Risk Reduction” as a concept, which is a 
subset of “Disaster Risk Management,”5 also has multiple definitions, or at least understandings.  
For present purposes, however, we chose to develop a DRR definition that facilitates its use with 
our now five core questions and our adapted analytic framework for accountability in Figure 1.  
The result in our forthcoming paper is an emphasis on vulnerability reduction where we define 
DRR as (italics in the original): 
 a set of coherent and systematic actions designed to reduce the physical, 
economic, social, and environmental vulnerabilities of a given community 
or component part of a community to the particular hazard or hazards to 
which it is exposed.  More specifically, for a given community or 
component part of a community, DRR constitutes actions designed to 
reduce the probability that losses from its most likely hazard events (e.g., 
an earthquake of a particular magnitude, a hurricane of a particular 
intensity, a toxic spill of a particular potential lethality and dispersal) 
would exceed the resources required for effective local coping.6 
                                                            
4 In some cases, for example in small countries such as Samoa, the affected “community” may be the entire national 
society, so we are simplifying here by eliminating the “society” term.  
5 Disaster risk management may be understood as a systematic process of using administrative directives, 
organizations, and operational capabilities to implement strategies and policies to lessen the impacts of hazards and 
to improve coping abilities.  More generally, disaster risk management aims to avoid, lessen, or transfer the adverse 
effects of hazards through activities and measures of prevention, mitigation, and preparedness (see ISDR 2009). 
6 This definition also satisfies the need in a DRR context for understanding the “what” component in Bovens’ four 
core questions.   
6 
 
With these various definitions established, one might assume that addressing Bovens’ 
four core questions and our fifth in the DRR policy domain would then be relatively 
straightforward.  In the vernacular, however, the response would have to be “not so much and 
not so fast,” because: 
1. Few established forums or “principals” exist for actors as “agents” to regularly 
explain and justify their DRR actions, which is exacerbated by the fact that the major 
DRR deficiencies in most communities result not from decisions and actions per se 
but rather from non-decisions,7 inaction, and/or symbolic actions. 8  Indeed, as we 
will explore below, our interest in the media derives from its proffered or potential 
role as a surrogate forum in many countries. 
2. Multiple actors, including in the private sector, are required for any substantive DRR 
achievements, which raises the often discussed “Many Hands” (see Thompson 1980) 
conundrum for accountability. 
3. It is not immediately clear “what” is to be accounted for in the short-term when DRR 
deficiencies or failings in a community may not be glaringly revealed for 50 to 100 or 
more years.  The “what” problem for DRR is further complicated by the fact that 
actions may be “corrective” (reducing existing vulnerabilities) or “prospective” 
(avoiding the creation of new/additional vulnerabilities).    
                                                            
7 The concept “non-decisions” has a specific meaning in political science, where it refers to issue suppression or the 
power to keep issues off of public, institutional, and decision agendas.  That is, non-decision making is not in fact 
“deciding not to decide,” which leaves a documentable trace, but rather the power to keep a troubling issue from 
even achieving an agenda position where “deciding not to decide” is necessary in the first place.   
8 Symbolic action gives the appearance of concern or activity, but lacks substance.  An example in a DRR context 
would be the enactment of a strict building code or land use plan – but without providing any of the resources and 
implementing regulation necessary to be in fact effective.     
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4. Remarkably few political and economic leaders appear to feel any “sense of 
obligation” to explain themselves on DRR issues except in the aftermath of a disaster.  
For our purposes here on the “why” problem, we identify three possible types of 
obligation: legal, moral/ethical, and media-driven. 
5. The value of transparency and the need for effective participation by the public in 
decision-making are not, shall we say, fully embraced by leaders and elites in many 
countries.  
A Post-Event Media Analysis Methodology 
Given time and resource constraints, we limited our analysis to print media coverage in 
the 60-day period following each of the events.  That is, we focused on coverage in Haiti and 
Jamaica in the period January 12-March 11 for the Haiti earthquake catastrophe, and February 
27-April 26 for the Chile earthquake/tsunami disaster (which was in analytically important ways 
two different events). 
We coded media treatment according to basic event coverage but then also their putative 
DRR-relevant roles: (1) essentially neutral information providing, (2) negative --
watchdog/whistleblower/blame assignment, (3) positive -- recognition/credit giving, (4) problem 
identification/agenda-setting, particularly as that related to not only risk reduction, but also risk 
identification (determining the occurrence probabilities of identified hazards and the associated 
consequences), disaster management (warning-alert, preparedness, and then response), and 
disaster recovery (which includes both rehabilitation and full-scale reconstruction).   
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We also used the Bovens “four questions,” our fifth question, and our adapted 
accountability framework to develop a case specific type of report card on post-event public 
accountability by focusing on (1) the who-actor issue, (2) the what is to be explained problem, 
(3) the who-forum question, (4) the why feel obligated issue, and (5) the how it could be 
accomplished issue.  
With one exception, we chose two main media outlets in each country.  For Chile it was 
El Mercurio and La Tercera; for Peru it was El Comercio and La República; and for Haiti it was 
Le Nouvelliste and Haiti en Marche.  In Jamaica it was only The Gleaner.9  The Haiti case was 
especially daunting.  The massive devastation of the earthquake and the total collapse of media 
facilities and broadcasting stations themselves (which interrupted their services for over a month) 
made initial research very difficult.  Indeed, the catastrophe so disrupted Haiti that the 
international donor conference on Haitian reconstruction only convened on March 31, 2010.  
Nonetheless, we had direct access to all available PDF files of Le Nouvelliste for the period in 
question.  To complement that source, considering that no other media were available in-country, 
we selected a weekly edition of the Haitian diaspora paper in the U.S., published in Miami, Haiti 
en Marche. 
Our choice of observing “mirror countries” was based on the fact that Jamaica shares a 
similar (and also previously underappreciated) tectonic environment with Haiti, and Peru has 
essentially the same earthquake and tsunami risk as Chile – if not worse because of higher 
vulnerabilities.  In the mirror countries we were particularly interested in the extent to which (or, 
                                                            
9 The Observer, a second outlet in Jamaica, turned out to be unavailable for the period under study.  
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frankly, if) local-national policy and program lessons were being drawn in Jamaica and Peru 
from the Haiti and Chile events respectively. 
Our coders worked independently after first being oriented and trained. The coding also 
had to accommodate the three main languages (English, Spanish, and French/Creole), and the 
principal authors here carried out a coding verification process to assure adequate inter-coder 
reliability.  
II. The Event Cases: Haiti and Chile 
The January 12, 2010 Haiti Catastrophe           
  It is never a good sign when the final death toll from an event is commonly modified by 
the adjective “estimated” or “approximately.”  With the Haiti death toll from the magnitude 7.3 
January 12, 2010 earthquake at roughly 220,000,10 and taking the population of the capital Port-
au-Prince, the principal loss site, at between 2.5 and 3 million,11 the percentage of those killed 
(not even including those injured) reaches somewhere between 7% and 9%.  That is a staggering 
level, especially by Western Hemisphere standards, and qualifies the 2010 Haiti event as a 
catastrophe, not merely a disaster. 
As in most earthquakes, the principal cause of death and injury was structural failure, 
which is an engineering euphemism for people being crushed in the collapse of homes and 
buildings, many of them multistory.  What then was the “cause of the cause,” why did so many 
                                                            
10 Government of the Republic of Haiti - Haiti Earthquake PDNA: Assessment of damage, losses, general and 
sectoral needs. Annex to the Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti 2010. March 2010. 
11 It is also not a good sign when no consensus figure exists on the population of the capital city even before the 
event, let alone of the nation. 
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structures fail?  Or to recall one of the core analytic questions for accountability, “What is to be 
explained or justified?” 
The primary culprit in the Haiti catastrophe was the failure of a large number of 
structures that were (1) poorly sited (a land use issue), (2) poorly based (a soils and foundation 
issue), and (3) poorly built (a design, code enforcement, and construction issue).  The poignant 
question for this 21st century catastrophe then becomes:  Given all that we know and have known 
about earthquakes and seismic design for decades, how could this have happened?  From a DRR-
accountability perspective, addressing this question yields a complex and ultimately disturbing 
answer that (1) reaches back decades, (2) involves the private sector as well as the informal 
sector, (3) reveals enormous public sector governance problems, including the documentable 
lack of systematic risk assessments, land use planning, building codes, and construction 
supervision, and (4) exposes the increasing presence of an international community that set up 
essentially a parallel governance structure, with all the logically ensuing efficacy and efficiency 
problems. 
Table 1 on the following page captures the more objective aspects of the earthquake’s 
impact in Haiti’s capital, Port-au-Prince (PaP), and the nearby cities of Carrefour and Jacmel, as 
well as other areas to the west and south of Port-au-Prince.  Most of the post-impact international 
attention focused on PaP, a city that grew from roughly 1 million in 1985 to 3 million in 2010.  
That growth, however, was not supported by any corresponding planning and infrastructure  
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Table 1 
Damage & Losses 
Haiti January 12, 2010 earthquake12 
 
Category  Amount  
Deaths  220,000 
Missing  N/A 
Victims (estimated injured, lost housing, died, and missing)  1,300,000 
Housing (damaged or destroyed)  105,000 
Housing (damaged or destroyed)  208,000 
Economic losses  $ 7,804 billion 
Employment losses, production losses, reduction in revenue and 
increasing in production costs $ 3,561 billion 
Public sector losses  $ 2,081 billion 
Houses (total loss)  $ 2,300 billion 
Temporary shelters, demolition and value of rental losses $ 739 million 
Commerce (damage and losses) $ 639 million 
Transport and public administration buildings  (damage and losses) $ 595 million 
Health (damage and losses) $ 470 million 
Education (damage and losses) $ 477 million 
Transport (damage and losses) $ 596 million 
Urban infrastructure (damage and losses) $ 595 million 
 
development.  In effect the urban in-migration was just “accommodated” throughout the city by 
using any available space, including slopes and flood-prone areas, streets themselves, canal and 
stream banks, and supposedly open space within and between existing more “formal” 
developments. 
The fact that the President’s Palace, Parliament, the Law Courts, and most Ministry and 
public administration buildings collapsed exacerbated Haitian governance (dis)abilities.  The 
situation was further aggravated by the intense damage and the loss of top leadership and staff 
suffered by the United Nations mission in Haiti, which severely affected its coordination 
                                                            
12 Government of the Republic of Haiti - Haiti Earthquake PDNA: Assessment of damage, losses, general and 
sectoral needs. Annex to the Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti 2010. March 2010. 
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abilities.  A U.N. report from three months after the earthquake highlighted a number of response 
problems, including, more subtly, its own: 
Despite the quick mobilization of aid, the quality of the achievements was 
drastically affected by serious constraints linked to the magnitude of the disaster, 
the uncontrollable flow of frequently inexperienced small NGOs, the 
inappropriateness of many practices in urban contexts, and weak global 
leadership.13 
The February 27, 2010 Chile Disaster  
While President Bachelet repeatedly used the term “catastrofe” to describe the impacts of 
the February 27, 2010 earthquake (a remarkable but not unprecedented magnitude 8.814) and 
resulting tsunami in south-central Chile, it clearly was not.  With 52115 killed, it was a disaster, 
but it had two casualty components: those killed by the earthquake and those killed by the 
tsunami.  Interestingly, no publicly available data break down the casualties by sub-event, 
primarily earthquake victims in Concepción and those killed by tsunami in the coastal areas of 
O’Higgins, Maule, and Bio Bio regions.   
From a DRR-accountability perspective, answering the “cause of the cause” question for 
these two types of losses (earthquake versus tsunami) reveals serious differences. While the 
earthquake showed Chile as having First World quality building codes and enforcement, the 
                                                            
13 Groupe URD-GPPI: Inter‐agency real‐time evaluation in Haiti: 3 months after the earthquake, Paris, August 31, 
2010 Page 8. 
14 The 1960 Valdivia earthquake, further to the Chilean south, which also generated a devastating tsunami, was a 
magnitude 9 event. 
15 Ministry of Interior, Chile, Available at  http://www.interior.gov.cl/filesapp/Lista_fallecidos.pdf  
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tsunami uncovered Chile’s remaining Third World characteristics, particularly alert system flaws 
at the central government level and risk-blind land use and zoning at the more local level. 
Context always matters, and it should be noted that the Chilean disaster occurred in the 
midst of a presidential transition.  President Michelle Bachelet was leaving the presidency when 
the earthquake struck, and 12 days later, on March 11, Sebastian Piñera was inaugurated as 
Chile’s new president.  In a clear attempt to mark the distinction for both the public and the 
media even before taking office, Piñera offered that “Our future government won’t be the 
earthquake government … It’s going to be a government of reconstruction.”16 
Table 2 below captures the more objective aspects of the Chilean earthquake-tsunami. 
Table 2 
Damage & Losses 
Chile February 27, 2010 earthquake 17 
 
Category  Amount  
Deaths  521  
Missing  56  
Victims (estimated injured, lost housing, died, and missing)  800,000  
Housing (damaged or destroyed)  200,000  
Housing (damaged or destroyed only Santiago)  12,000  
Economic losses  $ 30 billion  
Employment loss  15,000 jobs lost  
Public sector losses  $ 9.33 billion  
Houses (total loss)  81,440  
Houses (heavy damage)  108,914  
Impacted small cities over 5,000 inhabitants 45  
Impacted large cities over 100,000 inhabitants 5  
Secondary schools (some damage)  4,013  
                                                            
16 Bloomberg-Businessweek Quake Shakes Pinera’s Plan to Spur Chilean Economy, March 11, 2010, 4:38 PM EST. 
Retrieved on October 8, 2010. http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-03-11/quake-shakes-chilean-president-
pinera-s-plan-to-spur-economy.html  
17 Earthquake Engineering Research Institute (EERI) Special Earthquake Report, The Mw 8.8 Chile Earthquake of 
February 27, 2010. Retrieved on June 2010, 
http://www.eeri.org/site/images/eeri_newsletter/2010_pdf/Chile10_insert.pdf  
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III. Media Analyses: Affected Countries, Mirror Countries 
As noted previously, we examined catastrophe/disaster media coverage for 60 days post-
impact for Haiti and its mirror country, Jamaica, and for Chile and its mirror, Peru.  That 
translates into the period January 13 to March 12 for the former dyad and February 28 to April 
27, 2010 for the latter.  Again as noted previously, we analyzed two print media outlets in each 
of the countries, with the exception of Jamaica, where we were able to secure coverage from 
only one outlet. 
Table 3 presents the total number of event-related articles for each of the four countries 
(1,184 total), but it also breaks down the data by each story’s predominant content: (1) media 
role, (2) risk management, and (3) public accountability. 
Table 3 
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These Table 3 data reveal that approximately 19% (228 stories) of the articles are from 
Haiti, 57% from Chile (677 stories), 9% from Jamaica (105 stories), and 15% from Peru (174 
stories. 
Graph 1  
 
Graph 1 shows the total number of event-related stories by media outlet, coded by 
country.  Not surprisingly given the country’s level of development and literacy rate, Chile far 
outpaces the other countries in numbers of stories.  Another advantage for Chile, particularly in 
contrast to Haiti, of course, is that the earthquake did not physically damage media offices and 
facilities, nor did it damage most of the critical infrastructures on which media depend for daily 
operations.  A telling indicator of the impact of the Haiti earthquake is that the diaspora media 
outlet, Haiti en Marche, which is based in Miami, was able to cover the event and its aftermath 
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far more fully (160 stories) than its badly damaged internal counterpart, Le Nouvelliste (68 
stories), which did not effectively function for weeks after impact.     
Graph 2 
 
Graph 3  
 
Graph 4 
17 
 
 
Graph 5 
 
Graphs 2-5 present the date distributions of event-related stories over the 60-day period 
for each of the countries, Haiti, Chile, Jamaica, and Peru respectively.  The picture that emerges 
should not be surprising: a strong early peak with a falloff starting around the third week, 
particularly in the affected countries (Haiti and Chile).  More of a surprise is that the mirror 
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countries (Jamaica and Peru) show media attention to their respective neighbor’s events that 
while lesser in absolute number is somewhat flatter (less of an abrupt decay) and more sustained 
over the whole period.  
Media Roles 
To recall, our framework to assess the role(s) that media played in the aftermath of the 
two events comprised four categories: (1) informational, (2) negative/blame-assigning, (3) 
positive/credit-giving, and (4) agenda-setting.  As Graph 6 demonstrates, the informational role 
predominated in all four countries.  While our coding allowed for more than one role in a media 
story, the informational role predominated. In Haiti, 77% of the stories fell in this category, and 
in Chile it was 73%.  Our mirror cases showed Jamaica with 75% and Peru with 94% 
informational.  
The second most common media role was negative/blame assignment in all four 
countries, with the third most common being attempts at agenda-setting.  The least common role 
was in the positive/credit-giving category. 
Graph 6 
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More specifically for “negative/blame-assigning,” that role in Haiti reached 29% (65 out 
of 128 stories); in Jamaica it was 18% (19 out of 105); in Chile it was 22% (152 out of 677); and 
in Peru it reached 24% (41 out of 174).  The content in the negative/blame-assigning category for 
Haiti had two primary themes and targets: (1) the passivity, incapacity, and indifference of the 
Haitian government, and (2) the lack of donor response coordination by the international 
community and non-governmental organizations, and their participation in the design of 
reconstruction. 
In Chile, the negative/blame-assigning focused on the failure of the Chilean government 
and technical agencies to properly activate the tsunami alert.  Lesser but still significant attention 
was paid to post-impact insecurity and civil unrest and to the Bachelet government’s delay in 
bringing the Armed Forces into the response.   
Subsequent negative blame-assigning stories in Chile focused on discrepancies between 
government institutions on the official death toll, especially the lack of reliable data separating 
earthquake from tsunami fatalities.  The media also consistently critiqued the role of the private 
sector, particularly in the housing and public infrastructure collapses.  A lesser but still 
identifiable negative theme was regulatory deficiencies in land use management.  
In Jamaica and Peru, the negative/blame-assigning emphases revolved around building 
codes and enforcement and communication deficiencies, particularly in the badly botched 
tsunami alert.  The media in both mirror countries emphasized the need for comprehensive 
disaster plans, accompanied by drills and exercises in disaster response.  
20 
 
Although the least common media role (10% in Haiti, 3% in Chile, 9% in Jamaica, and 
1% in Peru), positive/credit-giving showed interesting themes.  In Haiti, the emphases were on 
the endurance of the Haitian people, the services provided by the private telecommunication 
company, and the commitment and self-sacrifice of local professional nurses. 
In Chile, the media gave positive marks to the role of the Armed Forces and the practice 
of seismic insurance coverage (1 in 5 houses have earthquake insurance, and all mortgage credits 
require seismic insurance).  Positive stories in Jamaica focused on national and local authorities 
(especially in Kingston) working on disaster preparedness and on local insurers reviewing 
seismic risk assessments for commercial and residential buildings.  In Peru, two positive stories 
acknowledged the role of the Peruvian Navy in activating the tsunami alert after the Chilean 
event was registered. 
Our fourth category is agenda-setting, which ranks third in the four categories across all 
four countries. Haiti shows 14% of the articles focusing on public agenda items that need 
attention, Chile 31%, Jamaica 14%, and Peru 4%.  The Haiti stories in the agenda-setting 
category emphasize disaster impacts on employment, education, cultural patrimony, the role of 
the international community, and corruption. 
The Chilean media almost immediately picked up on conflicts, gaps, and overlaps 
between governmental agencies during the emergency, as well as between local and national 
governments. The media also identified telecommunication failures, the need to improve the 
national seismic detection network, and public contracting, especially ill-defined private sector 
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involvement in concession laws.18 Finally, the Chilean media raised the issue of popular 
participation to achieve broader consensus on reconstruction.  
The media in Jamaica and Peru show less emphasis on agenda-setting stories. In Jamaica, 
the media focused on the need to reach the whole country – not simply Kingston – in earthquake 
preparedness, public infrastructure, tourism, and housing. In Peru, the media underscored the 
need for improved earthquake preparedness, funding of local and regional risk management, 
construction of public infrastructure, and revised and upgraded building codes.  
Risk Management Dimensions 
What do our media coding results tell us about treatment of “risk management?”  To 
recall, that umbrella concept comprises four elements: (1) risk identification, (2) risk reduction, 
(3) disaster management, and (4) recovery.  Graph 7 presents the results across the four 
countries. 
Graph 7  
 
                                                            
18 A concession is a business operated under a contract or license associated with a degree of exclusivity in business 
within a certain geographical area, for example, railroads, roads, sports arenas or public parks. 
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Not expected but logical upon reflection, media discussion of risk identification differs 
between the affected countries and the mirror countries.  While the data for Haiti and Chile show 
1% and 4% of stories dealing with risk identification, those percentages surge to 20% for 
Jamaica and 13% for Peru.  That is, and clearly reflecting a “It could happen here” concern, 
mirror country media paid more attention to local to national risk identification themes.  The 
articles in Jamaica revolved around seismic risk assessments and cost-benefit analyses, while in 
Peru the stories focused on vulnerabilities, particularly hospitals, housing, and the private sector, 
the latter reflecting a worry over the employment effects of a major, Chilean-type event.   
The affected countries, on the other hand, just saw their underlying risk turn into 
catastrophe/disaster, so their attention was logically elsewhere in this 60-day span.  Inattention to 
risk identification is particularly notable in Haiti.  In Chile, the few stories on risk identification 
focused on deficiencies in hazard monitoring capabilities, weak instrumentation, and the 
domestic scarcity of expertise.  
A similar affected-versus-mirror country pattern emerges with risk reduction.  Media in 
Haiti show only 2% of stories focusing on risk reduction, and Chile 4%.  Risk reduction as a 
theme in Jamaica is 15%, and in Peru it reaches 34%.  The content of Jamaica’s stories on risk 
reduction highlight building codes, risk transfer mechanisms, market insurance, and improving 
private sector safety practices.  Media coverage of risk reduction in Peru focused on building 
codes, soil studies, public investment in infrastructure, international assistance for DRR, and land 
use management.  The Peruvian media gave special attention to the need to learn from Chile and 
emulate many of its risk reduction measures. 
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Disaster management as a category captures the most media attention across cases.  In 
Haiti, the percentage of stories focused on disaster management was 19%, but it was a 
remarkably consistent 61% in Chile, Jamaica, and Peru. The Haiti anomaly (19%) is due to 
covering the overwhelming physical destruction. 
Recovery as a focus shows Haiti with 21% of the stories, Chile with 39%, Jamaica with 
18%, and Peru with 12%.  The Haiti data confirm that much of the affected area remained in the 
emergency phase for weeks, if not months, where recovery was a hope, not a reality.  The 
predominant recovery themes in Haiti were funds allocations, participation in reconstruction 
planning, and critiques of the excessive role of the international community.   
Not surprisingly given the lesser damage and much better response, the Chilean media 
moved to recovery issues relatively quickly, which was accelerated politically by the transition 
from the “disaster government” of Bachelet to the “reconstruction government” of Piñera, a 
rather deftly accomplished issue spin.  More substantively, the Chilean media focused on 
reconstruction funding and its impact on the incoming president’s political agenda, and the 
critiques of new national taxation initiatives to pay for the rebuilding.     
In the mirror countries, 18% of the stories in Jamaica fell in recovery and 12% in Peru, 
probably reflecting less local relevance in each country.  The Jamaican media emphasized 
cooperating with other Caribbean states in the reconstruction of Haiti, especially financially and 
technically.  Interestingly, the media in Peru tended to criticize the country’s own reconstruction 
following its most recent three earthquakes.  
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The Accountability Issue 
To what extent did the media in our four countries attempt to serve as watchdogs and/or 
assign blame (but to be fair, a few times give positive credit) in the context of the 
catastrophe/disaster?  That is and more specifically, where did media attempts at accountability 
in Haiti, Chile, Jamaica, and Peru fall in our original five core questions?  To recall, those 
questions or categories comprise four from Bovens and our fifth.  Table 4 and Graph 8 present 
our findings on Who-Actor, Who-Forum, What, Why, and How. 
Table 4  
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Graph 8 
 
While no coherency emerges from the four countries across the five categories, the 
number of data points reflected by the table and graph shows a real, if somewhat scattered, media 
interest in DRR-accountability.  To the extent that a pattern emerges, it is more of a “shotgun” 
blast, where individual hard points at attempted accountability are evidenced, but considerable 
open space exists between those points.  More specifically on DRR-accountability and 
highlighting some main observations, we see the following: 
Haiti – The media attempted to hold accountable the president, the prime minister, and 
the international community for a “safer” reconstruction, and they implicitly accepted that the 
sense of obligation would have to be moral-ethical, not legal-constitutional.  They were also 
essentially silent on the most appropriate forum in which and to which the actors should report.  
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Chile – The media in this country seemed to hold the president (Bachelet) unusually 
personally responsible for the failure of the tsunami warning system, along with several 
government agencies.  Looking forward, the Chilean media point to the Congress as the most 
likely forum, and emphasize legal as the best method to assure obligation to account.   
Jamaica and Peru – The media in both mirror countries showed real concern for 
increasing vulnerability due to poor land use and inadequate and unenforced building codes.  
Both media pointed to Congress as the most appropriate forum for rendering accounts by 
regulatory agencies, but both were silent on the best measure to assure obligation.  
It is obvious from these “country pellets” that the media can and do play a role in disaster 
context accountability, and they could probably do much more if they had incentives to do so.  
The fundamental problem, however, resides in one of our very first findings: the short attention 
span and relatively rapid decay rate of media disaster coverage.  Nonetheless, this remains a 
crucial area for policy attention and further research.  
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Table 5 
 Who - Actor Who - Forum What Why How 
Haiti 
President Preval is the main 
actor mentioned followed by 
the Prime Minister, the 
international community, 
NGO’s, and the private sector. 
The media allude to 
regulatory agencies, the 
Senate, the National Council 
of Political Parties, and the 
international community.  
Principal topics of 
discussion are the 
reconstruction plan and 
resources for 
reconstruction, economic 
policies and public 
management capacity. 
Issues of insecurity are also 
mentioned.  
Relations between state 
and donors and the use of 
donations. Land tenure, 
and housing infrastructure. 
Most of the discussion 
revolves around ethics, 
moral and altruistic  
considerations.  
Existence of hypothetic 
regulatory framework, but 
not real. 
Steady demand for 
participation of the Haitian 
people in the decision 
making process. 
Demand to the 
international community 
for transparency in 
financial issues. 
Chile 
The political subcategory 
(outgoing president Bachelet 
and incoming president 
Piñera) has the most coverage, 
associated with the tsunami 
alert and civil-military 
relationship. Less mention to 
regional and local authorities.  
In the private sector, 
prevailing themes are related 
to the construction industry, 
engineers and architects 
associations, real estate 
companies, and the insurance 
market.  
In the technical and scientific, 
the stories associate with the 
responsibilities of Onemi and 
Shoa in the tsunami alert. The 
operative subcategory refers to 
Most of the coverage refers 
to the role of the Parliament 
in the discussion of the 
reconstruction plan, 
funding, and concessions 
law. 
Investigation of 
government’s institutions in 
the emergency period.  
Revision of the national 
control system with a 
special interest in urban 
planners, as well as the 
demands by tsunami 
victims’ families.   
The prospective 
subcategory emphasizes 
the reconstruction plan and 
its financing, risk 
assessments, building 
codes, and the tsunami 
early warning system.  
 
 
The legal subcategory 
focuses on deficiencies in 
enforcement of building 
codes, the lack of 
regulations regarding soil 
mechanics,  
Strong role of the media in 
demanding public 
responsibility for the errors 
in the emergency phase and 
denunciations against 
malpractices of constructing 
agencies (public 
infrastructure and housing).  
 
 
 
 
Media coverage reveal the 
need for transparency 
mechanisms in public 
biding processes. The need 
for participation is 
expressed in the design of 
the reconstruction plan, 
with particular emphasis in 
the youth population.  
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the armed forces. 
Jamaica 
The prevailing accountable 
actors are the Prime Minister 
and the Parliament, the 
construction industry, and the 
Office of Disaster 
Preparedness and Emergency 
Management (ODPEM).  
The subcategories most 
mentioned are the 
Parliament, and Regulatory 
Agencies.  
This category emphasizes 
Jamaica’s disaster 
preparedness plan, and 
building codes.  
One of the themes 
mentioned is the safety 
manual for the building and 
construction industry, and 
the occupational safety and 
health act.  
Media coverage promotes 
participation in disaster 
preparedness, and the 
compliance of safety 
regulations. In regard to 
transparency, it mainly 
refers to access to 
information from insurers 
companies and information 
on natural risks by 
technical offices. 
Peru 
The subcategories that prevail 
are the technical and scientific, 
and the operational, with the 
Geophysics Institute, the Civil 
Defense National System 
(INDECI) and the Navy, with 
some mention to local 
authorities. In the private 
sector, the emphasis is placed 
on the construction industry.  
The Parliament captures 
most of the media attention, 
with a focus on disaster 
plans, housing policies and 
budget allocation.  
The themes that prevail are 
seismic regulation, land 
use management, tsunami 
alerts, building codes, 
zoning, and resettlement. 
The subcategories identified 
are related to media demand 
legal mandates.  
Few references to issues 
related to transparency and 
participation in disaster 
risk reduction.  
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IV. Conclusions 
Post-impact catastrophe/disaster environments – social, economic, and political – are 
both fluid and complex.  The core question approach and accountability framework that we 
adapted from Mark Bovens, however, have demonstrated their clarifying value, allowing us to 
sift through and make sense of a large amount of data from our four cases (two affected 
countries, two mirror countries), especially but not exclusively from the media. 
Two general observations or lessons stand out.  First, in the particular policy domain of 
Disaster Risk Reduction, accountability must focus on and be rendered by not only governmental 
actors but also the private sector, professional associations, civil society, and at times even the 
international community.  That is, DRR-accountability has to be a “Whole of Society” approach, 
not the task of any one sector, or even a few sectors, in isolation. 
Second, much more analytic attention needs to be paid to mirror countries in post-impact 
catastrophe/disaster situations.  In an almost instantaneous globalized communication 
environment, where images and commentary are close to costless and may be interpretively 
framed at will, the ability of other societies and leaders to learn from traumas in similar or 
neighboring countries has increased.  In fact, given that a society struck by a catastrophe or a 
disaster is often preoccupied with response issues for an extended period of time, it is in those 
very mirror countries that windows of opportunity for DRR innovations appear more likely than 
previously believed.  The challenge will be to turn those windows from case-by-case accidental 
instances to systematized cross-case processes.              
Third, the media are playing an increasingly crucial role in catastrophe/disaster situations, 
and so we must recall our three more specific central research questions from the early pages of 
this paper:  (1) What was the attention span, or rate of decay, of media attention to the Haiti 
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catastrophe and the Chile disaster? (2) Aside from providing the normally expected disaster and 
emergency response information, what other roles did the media play, particularly about 
accountability and “Disaster Risk Reduction?” (3) What major DRR problems or issues were 
notably absent in media coverage of the events?  That is, on what problems or issues were the 
media silent? 
The Attention Span Question 
 Not unexpectedly, our analysis confirms the relatively short attention span of the media 
in the countries under study, and the rate of decay in the affected countries was in fact steeper 
than in mirror countries starting in the third post-impact week.  Hence, even considering that the 
media in the two mirror countries showed fewer numbers of articles, the coverage was steadier 
over the eight-week period.  This finding was quite unexpected and deserves deeper and more 
longitudinal research. 
The Roles Question 
 As expected, the relatively neutral provision of information was the dominant role of the 
media in both the affected and mirror countries in the first 60 days after impact.  The more 
negative blame assignment/watchdog role of the media was substantial (ranking second across 
all cases), followed by less significant positive credit-giving and attempts at agenda-setting.    
 An unexpected finding, however, was the more probing and reflective stance taken by 
media in the two mirror countries.  The affected countries were clearly absorbed by the event 
itself and then the emergency response, but media coverage in the mirror countries turned more 
quickly to a “learning” focus, especially risk identification and risk reduction issues.  That is, the 
media in Jamaica after covering the immediate situation in Haiti and the media in Peru soon after 
the Chile event took on and framed DRR-accountability more quickly and more directly than the 
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media in the affected countries, identifying DRR-relevant actions, inactions, and responsibilities 
across a whole spectrum of actors.  
The Silence Question    
Particularly in terms of public agenda-setting, problems or issues that are not discussed or 
even posed by the media are often crucial, becoming essentially “zones of silence,” out of which 
ideas or proposals for change/improvement rarely escape.  From our four-country post-impact 
analysis we see three major DRR inhabitants in “zones of silence.”  The first is inattention to 
longer-term social mechanisms to decrease vulnerability and improve resilience, rather than to 
the more politically attractive short-term physical-infrastructural.  
The second problem or issue not discussed is what should be done about the huge 
inventory of existing – but suspect – components of the built environment (buildings and 
infrastructure).  That is, the need for and the implications of a major structural retrofitting 
program went virtually untreated in the media across the cases, a rather large item to be in a zone 
of silence given the various countries’ risk profiles. 
Finally and related, the third item not or barely treated in the four country media is risk 
identification and risk reduction issues.  The practical result of that silence is to forfeit the 
opportunity to put DRR explicitly on the public agenda, without which permanent DRR 
advances are unlikely-to-impossible.   
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